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Abstract 
In Science, Truth and Democracy, Kitcher moderates the strongest ontological realist thesis he 
defended in The Advancement of Science, with the aim of making compatible the correspondence 
theory of truth with conceptual relativity. However, it is not clear that both things could be 
harmonized. If our knowledge of the world is mediated by our categories and concepts; if the 
selection of these categories and concepts may vary according to our interests, and they are not the 
consequence of the existence of certain supposed natural kinds or some intrinsic structure of the 
world, it is very problematic to establish what our true statements correspond to. This paper 
analyzes the transformation in Kitcher’s realism and expounds the main difficulties in this project. 
Finally, a modality of moderate ontological realism will be proposed that, despite of keeping the 
sprit of the conceptual relativity, is strong enough to support the correspondence theory of truth. 
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The last two decades have been a period of deep changes in the realm of the philosophy of science. 
Not only its hegemony among meta-scientific disciplines has been challenged by the sociology of 
science and, in general, by the social studies of science, but the objective that guided it from the 
beginning of its academic institutionalization with the Vienna Circle in the 1930’s —i. e. the 
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attempt to provide a global understanding of the aims, methodological rules, and differential 
epistemological traits that characterizes scientific knowledge— has been seriously disputed. An 
increasing number of authors seem to agree with Feyerabend that, from the axiological, 
methodological or epistemological point of view, there is nothing of interest that is common to all 
particular sciences. Hence, generic philosophical discourse about science is decreasing in recent 
publications to the benefit of specialized approaches about some concrete disciplines, especially 
economics, psychology and biology.  
I do not belief that this generic discourse is destined to disappear. On the contrary, I rather 
think that there is room enough and sufficient tasks ahead for the development of a general 
philosophy of science. Actually, two of the more discussed problems in the recent philosophy of 
science, i.e., the problem of rationality in the choice of theories and the debate about realism, are 
part of this generic discourse- They have attracted and continue to interest many important 
philosophers of science. But, what is undeniable is that the panorama of the philosophy of science 
has now become more complex, more diverse, and also more diffuse than previously. Thus, for 
better or for worse, one does not find anymore figures as all-embracing and influential in other 
branches of philosophy or even in the sciences as Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend.   
Nevertheless, if we had to mention present-day philosophers of science who are in line with 
this great tradition that marked the character of the philosophy of science during the second half of 
20th century, Philip Kitcher would be doubtless among them. Philip Kitcher is a philosopher of 
science that knows in some depth diverse scientific disciplines and has made important 
contributions to the philosophy of particular sciences, like mathematics and biology, being as well 
the author of The Advancement of Science, an extremely influential book on the general 
philosophy of science, published in 1993. Kitcher is well-known for his works on the philosophy 
of mathematics (particularly in his book The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge, 1983); for his 
criticism of creationism (in Abusing Science, 1982), intelligent design (in Living with Darwin, 
2007), and sociobiology (in Vaulting Ambition, 1985); and for his reflections about the 
possibilities opened up for humans from biotechnology (in The Lives to Come, 1996). Among his 
more characteristic theoretical contributions are the following five: (1) his conception of scientific 
explanation as unification (cf. Kitcher 1981; 1989a), (2) his defense, from the perspective of a 
naturalist approach, of a moderate realism, and his retorts to the main antirealist arguments (such 
as the pessimistic induction and the underdetermination) (cf. Kitcher 1993a, chaps. 5, 6 and 7; 
2001a, part I; 1993b; 2001b; 2002a), (3) his criticism of relativist and constructivism positions in 
Science Studies (cf. Kitcher 1993, chap. 6; 1998; 2001a), (4) his defense of pluralism about 
biological species and about the units of selection, together with his criticism of genetic 
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reductionism in biology (cf. Kitcher 1984a; 1984b; 1989b; Kitcher and Sterelny 1988), and (5) his 
analyses of the social and political background of the research agenda in present science (cf. 
Kitcher 2001a; Kitcher and Flory 2004).  
Kitcher’s general philosophy of science connects with the so-called “naturalistic turn” in 
philosophy of science (cf. Callebaut 1993; Zamora Bonilla 2000). That is to say, his philosophy 
tries to study science from an empirical basis, instead of doing it from immutable and supposedly 
universal epistemological preconceptions. He takes advantage, therefore, of the resources and 
results of some empirical sciences (particularly cognitive sciences, biology, and economics) in 
order to develop the pertinent epistemic models about scientific practice. The aim of this approach 
is not to provide a logical reconstruction of scientific theories or of scientific explanations, in the 
neopositivistic way; nor is it to offer a general view of the relation between the contents of theories 
and empirical evidence, as if this relation were context-independent; or to give an account of some 
allegedly timeless canons of rationality. Kitcher names ironically all of these aspirations, easily 
identifiable in the epistemological tradition, “The Legend.” Rather, the objective is to understand 
how scientists really act when they have to make important decisions about the theories that they 
sustain. It is precisely this attention to the real scientific practice that places Kitcher’s philosophy 
close to what can be called the “pragmatic turn” in the philosophy of science (also well 
represented by Ian Hacking (1983) and Andrew Pickering (1995)). The questions concerning the 
aims and values of scientific research, and the ways in which they condition scientific decisions 
and are related to democratic ideals, are of central importance in Kitcher’s work.  
My objectives in this paper are to analyze the main theses of the realism that Kitcher defends 
in The Advancement of Science (abbreviated as AS), and to evaluate the transformation this realism 
undergoes in his later book Science, Truth, and Democracy (abbreviated as STD). I will argue that, 
although these transformations are important, they are nevertheless those that can be strictly 
outlined when some aspects of science as social activity are faced from the position of a moderate 
realism. Finally, I will expose some internal ontological troubles that arise within Kitcher’s realist 
proposal and offer a possible solution.        
 
 
1. Kitcher’s Realism in The Advancement of Science 
 
Let us start by explaining what Kitcher means by realism. In AS (p. 127) he sums up his realist 
view of science with the following words: “scientists find out things about a world that is 
independent of human cognition; they advance true statements, use concepts that conform to 
natural divisions, develop schemata that capture objective dependencies.” Two basic components 
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of scientific realism are to be appreciated in this characterization: the ontological and the 
epistemological. According to the first, there is a world independent of any act of knowledge; 
according to the second, science could provide us with an adequate knowledge about the 
characteristics of this independent world. Kitcher goes even further and claims that scientists 
provide “true statements” (in the sense of truth as correspondence). His realism is, then, also a 
semantic realism, and on this point he follows Popper’s interpretation of Tarski’s work. Kitcher is 
one of the philosophers who believes that Tarski rehabilitated the traditional notion of truth as 
correspondence; a notion that would be based on daily use (cf. Kitcher 1993a, pp. 128-133; and, 
for an explanation of the components of scientific realism, Diéguez 1998). In addition, some pages 
before, Kitcher indicates that the scientific community might pursue both epistemic and non-
epistemic aims; being the obtaining of significant truths one fundamental (and permanent) 
epistemic goal. So, at least in part (although in an important part), scientific progress is measured 
by the elimination of falsehood in favor of significant truth (cf. Kitcher 1993a, pp. 94, 117 and 
120).1 This concept of significance, outlined in this work, will play a fundamental role in Science, 
Truth, and Democracy, where it will be developed substantially. 
However, Kitcher’s most explicit characterization of realism can be found in a work titled 
“A Plea for Science Studies,” written five years later. He presents there the main claims —which 
he considers uncontroversial— of “the Realist-Rationalist Cluster” (Kitcher 1998, pp. 34-35): 
 
1. In the most prominent areas of science, the research is progressive, and this progressive character is 
manifested in increased powers of prediction and intervention.  
2. Those increased powers of prediction and intervention give us the right to claim that the kinds of entities 
described in scientific research exist independently of our theorizing about them and that many of our 
descriptions are approximately correct.  
3. Nonetheless, our claims are vulnerable to future refutation. We have the right to claim that our 
representations of nature are roughly correct while acknowledging that we may have to revise them 
tomorrow.  
4. Typically our views in the most prominent areas of science rest upon evidence, and disputes are settled by 
appeal to cannons of reason and evidence.  
5. Those canons of reason and evidence also progress with time as we discover not only more about the world 
but also more about how to learn about the world.  
 
                                                 
1
 In “Knowledge, Society, and History,” Kitcher writes: “We mark the difference between those propositional states 
that accurately represent reality from those that do not by dividing the pertinent propositions into those that are true 
from those that are false. The notion of truth as correspondence is this not some peculiar metaphysical extravagance 
but part of an important way of thinking about ourselves and others,” (Kitcher 1993b, p. 166). Nevertheless, he 
concedes to Kuhn that the notion of truth cannot be applied to whole theories, (cf. Kitcher 1993a, p. 129). 
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As can easily be noted, this brand of realism has a clear Popperian flavor and it is even 
stronger than that proposed by some of Popper’s heirs. It is not a naïve realism, but a critical and 
fallibilist one (thesis 3). It is also plainly rationalist (thesis 4), although, unlike Popper’s realism, it 
is open to the possibility that canons of rationality may change historically (thesis 5). 
Despite the fact that Kitcher considers these five theses to be uncontroversial, he 
acknowledges in a footnote that the sense of thesis 2 has been legitimately disputed by some 
philosophers, such as Hilary Putnam, Arthur Fine, Nelson Goodman and Richard Rorty. He thinks 
that for these authors the problem with thesis 2 is not that it cannot have some acceptable sense, 
but that traditionally it has been loaded with questionable metaphysical additions. As for the 
authors, such as the antirealists from the field of Science Studies, whose rejection of the realist 
theses is more global, they have to take on the burden of proof. They have to show, with sound 
arguments, why the former theses are to be discarded. Indeed, Kitcher sees realism as the natural 
attitude that human beings develop spontaneously in their cognitive dealings with the world. If the 
antirealist attitude proliferates in philosophy, it is because it is erroneously believed that there are 
arguments against realism that cannot be satisfactorily answered.2 Seemingly, with this 
elucidation, Kitcher wishes to separate semantic antirealism (as that proposed by pragmatists and 
Putnam’s internal realism) from the radical antirealism coming from constructivist and relativist 
positions. If the former may be useful in order to discard some exaggerated claims of the realist 
position, the latter simply has no sufficient argumentative ground. Not surprisingly, Kitcher ends 
up by accepting in STD some ideas of the first type of antirealism.  
Thesis 1 and thesis 2 jointly constitute the basis of a central argument adduced by realists 
and, consequently, one of the main targets of antirealist criticism. It is the sort of argument known 
as ‘inference to the best explanation’, in this case applied to realism as an explanation of scientific 
success. The argument is as follows: the enormous predictive, explanatory, practical… success of 
science is a surprising fact that requires an explanation; the best explanation of such success is to 
suppose that the entities referred by scientific theories do exist and that these theories formulate 
(approximately) true claims about them (as realism holds); therefore, realism should be accepted. 
Sometimes the argument is strengthened, as Putnam managed at the initial realist phase of his 
intellectual trajectory, with the claim that otherwise, scientific success would be ‘a miracle’ (cf. 
Putnam 1978, p. 19). That would imply that realism is not only the best explanation of scientific 
success, but actually the only sensible one.  
                                                 
2
 Kitcher thinks that the advantages of realism are decisive, so that the burden of proof lies with the antirealists (cf. 
Kitcher 1993a, p. 132). But in “Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy,” (2001b, p. 171), Kitcher gives up the conviction 
that realism is the default position, the common sense position; and he holds that, after overcoming the antirealist 
arguments, positive arguments should be provide in favour of realism. 
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Bas van Fraassen (1980, pp. 19-40; 1989, pp. 142-150), Larry Laudan (1981, pp. 19-48), 
Michael Levin (1984, pp. 124-139) and Arthur Fine (1986, pp. 114 and ff.) have expressed the 
main criticisms to this argument. In AS, Kitcher focus his attention on answering Laudan, since he 
believes that Laudan offers the best antirealist strategy, but he also makes some critical references 
to van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism (cf. Kitcher 1993a, pp. 150-157; see also 2001a, pp. 19-
24; 1993b; 2001b).3 Laudan’s argument against realism is known as ‘the pessimistic induction’. It 
appeals to the history of science; and its central idea is very simple: approximate truth and correct 
reference cannot be, as realists claim, the best explanation of scientific success, for there can be 
found in the past (and not in a very distant past) empirically successful theories whose central 
terms failed in their reference, i. e., they referred to entities considered nowadays as non-existent, 
like the phlogiston, the ether, the crystalline spheres, the caloric, the vital force, etc. If the realist is 
right, then how could these false theories have been successful in the past? They do not merely 
include some inaccuracies or make some specific mistakes, but are grounded on the postulation of 
completely non-existent entities. 
Kitcher responds to this argument by denying that historical record supports that pessimism. 
In principle, as Michael Devitt (1984) points out, there are reasons to maintain just the opposite. In 
Devitt’s view, if a conclusion should be drawn by inductive reasoning from historical cases, there 
are more reasons to draw an optimistic conclusion. There have been an increasing number of cases 
of approximate truth and preserved reference in theoretical terms (from the point of view of 
current science), at least if we consider recent historical periods. However, since no one counted 
the number of referring and non-referring theoretical terms in the historical record, it is nothing 
more than an impression. On the other hand, even it were true that the amount of theoretical terms 
that keep their reference surpass the amount of non-referring terms, that would still leave 
unexplained the success of the theories mentioned by Laudan, and it would not explain why the 
persistence of the currently postulated theoretical entities makes its existence more credible than 
the existence of the entities postulated in the past, some of which have survived for a long time. 
This is the reason that impels Kitcher to look for a more forceful counter-argument. 
He considers, then, a more plausible way to get an optimistic conclusion from the historical 
record. Throughout the history of science, successive theories (or explanatory schemata, 
statements, etc.) appear closer to the truth than previous ones from the perspective of some other 
                                                 
3
 Michael Levin’s criticism consists of arguing that truth has no explanatory capacity. Kitcher responds in his (2002a). 
Van Fraassen’s criticism aims to show the fallacious character of the realist argument. The point is that, either the 
argument presupposes what is to be proved —that the hypothesis that best explains a fact is true for that very reason—
, and therefore it is a circular argument, or it excludes, without justification, the possibility that all explanations of 
scientific success we have at the moment are unsuitable and, consequently, the realist explanation would just be the 
best one in a bad lot of explanations, without merits enough to be accepted. As far as I know, Kitcher has not 
answered this criticism, even though he has argued against constructive empiricism in general. 
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later theory. That authorizes us to suspect that our current theories will appear also in the future 
closer to the truth than do past theories. However, this proposal still seems too weak to Kitcher, for 
it assumes a generalized fallibilism for which the history of science gives no motive. We are not 
equally subject to error about everything. About some things we have obtained a firmer knowledge 
than about others. For that reason, “instead of a blanket pronouncement to the effect that our 
current theories are probably wrong, it would be far more instructive to investigate the stability of 
various components of practice in various fields.” (Kitcher 1993a, p. 138). It should be unveiled 
by reviewing the history of science and also with the aid of the cognitive sciences “where we are 
most likely to make mistakes and where we are legitimately confident.” (Kitcher 1993a, p. 138, 
note 16). 
Accordingly, in order to be convincing and undermine realist optimism Laudan’s argument 
would have to show not only that in the past there were non-referring and still successful theories, 
but also that among the parts of these theories responsible for their success there were some 
considered false from a realist perspective, i. e., some non-referring parts. The reason is clear: “it 
is not enough to conceive a theory as a set of statements and distribute the success of the whole 
uniformly over the parts. One has to see how the statements are used.” (Kitcher 1993a, p. 143). 
Laudan’s pessimistic induction fails, then, until it can be shown that the phlogiston, the crystalline 
spheres, the ether, and the other non-extant theoretical entities were essential elements in the 
success of the theories to which they belonged. The facts seem to indicate, however, that things 
were not like this. The postulation of ether, for example, was no more than a heuristic resource 
without any function in the predictive success of Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory.4 In this 
respect, Kitcher distinguishes within the scientific practice between the “working posits” and the 
“presuppositional posits.” The former are the referents of theoretical terms that occur in problem-
solving schemata; the latter are the entities that apparently have to exist if the solutions to the 
problems provided by the theory are true. Laudan would have shown, at best, that presuppositional 
posits are suspect, but he would not have proved anything about the working posits.5  
Kitcher also enlarges in AS on the answers to other well-known realist arguments: the theory 
ladenness of observation and the underdetermination of theories by evidence.6 
                                                 
4
 This argument has also been unfolded and illustrated with concrete historical cases by Stathis Psillos (1999, chaps. 5 
and 6). 
5
 Kitcher returns to this problem in STD (cf. Kitcher 2001a, pp. 16-19). However, apart from the replacement of the 
expression ‘working posits’ by ‘idle wheels’, he does not add anything new to his arguments, although there he insists 
about a point he have previously adduced (in Kitcher 1997a, p. 299), to wit, it is far from clear that the theories 
mentioned by Laudan were successful in some scientifically important sense (i.e. in their predictive and practical 
capacities). 
6
 Both arguments are also answered in very similar terms in “A Plea for Science Studies” (Kitcher 1998, pp. 38-41), 
and in STD (Kitcher 2001a, pp. 14-15 and chap. 3). In The Advancement of Science, Kitcher faces another important 
antirealist challenge, although not in great detail: the incommensurability problem. He thinks that his notion of 
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The thesis of the theory ladenness of observation is not properly an antirealist thesis. 
However, antirealists make frequent use of it, since, in a radical interpretation, may lead to 
antirealism. In effect, if all observation is theory-laden, and one assumes that observation is the 
basic touchstone to choose among theories, then the choice always will be made from the 
assumptions of a theory. That is interpreted by the antirealist as a recognition of the impossibility 
of an objective choice among theories, and, in extreme cases, as an acknowledgement that the 
notion of objective reality is completely non-functional and, therefore, senseless. In this extreme 
interpretation, what we call ‘objective reality’ is something constructed by our conceptual schemes 
or by our social practices. Kitcher points out two possible strategies in order to respond to this use 
of the theory-ladenness thesis. The first one is Fodor’s strategy, which shows that “the plasticity of 
observation has been greatly overrated” (Kitcher 1993a, p. 225). The other strategy is to resort in 
the problematic situations to shared beliefs for the resolution of the conflicts. In that case, the 
interpretation of the same stimuli by scientists with different theoretical backgrounds need not be 
different. After analyzing by means of this second strategy the dispute between Galileo and the 
Aristotelians about observations with the telescope —and rejecting Feyeranbend’s claims on this 
topic—, Kitcher concludes: “[W]e can recognize the dependence of observation and of 
observational reporting on background cognitive states without abandoning the thesis that the 
propensities acquired by specialists are observational skills. Trained professionals can demonstrate 
their virtuosity in ways that are appreciable by the laity, and so turn back the challenge that their 
alleged skill is merely masquerade.” (Kitcher 1993a, p. 233). In other words, even though it is 
accepted that observation is theory-laden, there are several ways of improving it (e. g. by making it 
more accurate, more detailed, less prone to error, etc.), and everybody can recognize these ways of 
improved observation as the best in a context.  
Therefore, the theory-ladenness of observation does not prevent us from considering some 
observations as better than others. The conflict between incompatible observational reports need 
not be unsolvable in a rational and objective way. The error of many antirealists, like Kuhn, is that 
they jump from the very reasonable thesis (although disputed by Fodor and some others) that our 
perception of nature is dependent on our theories, to the less justifiable claim that nature itself is 
                                                                                                                                                                
reference potential can explain how the reference is partially preserved through the changes of theories. Therefore, it 
neutralizes the objection raised by incommensurability to realism, according to which it is impossible to see the 
changes of theories as a progress towards a truer conception of reality if the reference is not maintained in these 
changes. The idea behind the notion of reference potential is that terms do not refer in a homogeneous way. There are 
several heterogeneous possibilities in which scientific community may fix their reference in each concrete case. 
Although, as Kuhn held, after a change of theory the reference potential has changed, it is always feasible to recognize 
the reference of some tokens of a term, and offer a translation of these tokens into the language of the new theory. We 
cannot find, for example, something equivalent to ‘phlogiston’ in the post-Lavoisier chemistry, but we can say that in 
some cases ‘dephlogisticated air’ was employed by Pristley referring to oxygen (cf. Kitcher 1993a, pp. 78 and 97-105; 
1982b, pp. 337-359). For a criticism of this position, see Niiniluoto (1999, pp. 131-132) and McLeish (2005).  
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dependent on our theories. Certainly, we do not have an Archimedean point (the God’s Eye point 
of view in Putnam’s terms) to establish beyond doubt that there is a match between our theories 
and reality. All access to reality are linguistically (or, in the traditional version of this argument, 
mentally) mediated, and, therefore, as Popper saw, they are theoretically mediated. But, this need 
not lead to deny an independent reality, or to deny that we can get access to it in more and more 
adequate ways (cf. Kitcher 1993a, pp. 131-132). 7  
As for the underdetermination argument, Kitcher thinks that it may be of some logical 
interest, but it has little to do with the actual scientific practice, wherein one hardly finds two 
completely equivalent theories in their observational consequences but different in their non-
observational postulates. If the prior scientific practice is taken into account, the serious 
empirically equivalent rivals of a given theory with respect to the same evidence are few in 
number. Furthermore, the contribution of new evidences may eventually dissolve this rivalry.8  
Kitcher also follows other critics of underdetermination, like Laudan, when he adduces that 
the consistency of a theory with the empirical evidence is one thing, and quite another is the 
support this evidence gives to such a theory. There may be two theories equally consistent with a 
set of evidences and, nonetheless, one of them may be better supported by these evidences than the 
other. Finally, in Kitcher’s view, the epistemological costs of maintaining a rival hypotheses and 
dropping the other could be, in a certain moment, too great —and even inadmissible—. As it 
would have happened if, for example, some version of geocentrism empirically equivalent to 
                                                 
7
 As we said in a previous note, in “A Plea for Science Studies”, he returns to the issue and he strengthens his 
arguments, although this time he exonerates Kuhn from any responsibility: “As Thomas Kuhn […] clearly saw, the 
fact that concepts and categories are involved in observation doesn’t mean that the content of experience is determined 
by them or that we cannot be led by experience to reconceptualize the phenomena. Nor does it imply that we are 
somehow ‘cut off’ from the world or that the only world we can talk about must be ‘constructed’. […] In perception, 
we are in causal contact with physical objects, and although this contact is mediated by our having certain kinds of 
psychological states (‘perceptions’, ‘representations’), we do not perceive by perceiving those states. […] So it would 
be more accurate to say not that the world is shaped by our categories but that our representations of the world are so 
shaped and that the shaping is open to empirical investigation.” (Kitcher 1998, pp. 38-39). The same idea appears in 
STD (cf. Kitcher 2001a, p. 15). 
8
 In STD Kitcher considers the possibility of finding complete and permanent empirical equivalences between rival 
theories (cf. Kitcher 2001a, pp. 34-35). He concludes that it would be necessary to analyze each particular case. 
Sometimes such theories might be two linguistic formulations of the same theory (as in the case of Schrödinger’s 
wave mechanics and Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics), on other occasions it might not be possible to make a 
scientifically based decision. In this work (p. 36), he concedes more importance to the problem. He does not see it 
anymore as a problem of scarce interest out of the philosophical realm, but he stresses its existence in scientific 
practice. Nonetheless, he remarks that it has less extent than it is supposed. It is not difficult to point out some cases in 
which it is not conceivable a serious and empirically equivalent alternative to an accepted theory. “What’s —he 
asks— the supposed rival to the hypothesis that the typical structure of DNA is a double helix with sugar-phosphate 
backbones and bases jutting inwards?” He adds (p. 32) also a new argument to show that, in case of real situations of 
complete and permanent empirical equivalence, the proponents of underdetermination could not maintain their theses. 
According to several proponents of underdetermination, particularly some sociologists of science, granted that 
scientific theories are always underdetermined by empirical evidence, the decision between a theory and its 
empirically equivalent rival will be always grounded on social and political preferences. Now then, to be coherent, the 
proponents of underdetermination should also accept that the thesis that a theory supports certain social and political 
values better than its rival is also empirically underdetermined. Therefore, the appeal of these non-epistemic values 
would not endow the choice with rationality. 
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Copernican heliocentrism had been maintained by someone in post-Copernican astronomy (cf. 
Kitcher 1993a, pp. 247-256).9 
Summing up, the realism Kitcher display in The Advancement of Science is a strong realism, 
as far as it goes beyond the minimal ontological realism in the style of the entity realism defended 
by Ian Hacking, Nancy Cartwright and some sociologists of science. Kitcher’s realism accepts the 
epistemological thesis that we can know reality in an adequate way; it is committed to the 
correspondence theory of truth; and it even claims that science provides us with many truths. 
There is, however, a stronger modality of realism that Kitcher does not reject, but neither does he 
openly embrace it. This modality holds that nature has its own causal structure (including natural 
kinds and objective dependences among phenomena), which is fixed independently of human 
cognition, and that our conceptual schemes are able to carve up this structure into its joints. 
Implied is that there can only be one correct way of representing a certain part of the world. True 
enough, Kitcher does not adhere either to the rival Kantian position, defended by Sellars and 
Putnam’s internal realism, which sees the structure of the world as a subject’s projection. 
Surprisingly, he presents his realism as compatible with both alternatives (cf. Kitcher 1993a, pp. 
169-173). 
In spite of that, Kitcher tones down in some ways the forcefulness of this realism. He notes, 
for example, that changes in scientists’ individual and collective practices —particularly changes 
in the identification of significant problems, and in the acceptance of explanatory schemes and 
statements— do not depend only on dictates of empirical evidence (on “encounters with nature,” 
in Kitcher’s terms), but also depend (although not in a exclusive way, as some sociologists 
assume) on the “conversations with peers.” Social factors have a role in the scientist’s decisions, 
but they are not determinant factors. Kitcher proposes an intermediate stance between extreme 
internalism and extreme externalism:  
 
The position that the sociologists attack is the extreme suggestion that social determinants make no difference: 
given the same inputs from asocial nature there will be the same modifications of consensus practice, no matter 
what the social structure. They counterpose the extreme view that inputs from nature are impotent, or at least 
impotent with respect to the framework of consensus practice: given the same social structure, there will be the 
same modifications of consensus practice, no matter what the inputs from asocial nature, and, in particular, the 
                                                 
9
 In “A Plea for Science Studies,” he sums up in a few words his position about the underdetermination problem: 
“Duhem started a line of thought that enables us to see that there is no instant rationality in science, but it’s wrong to 
conclude from this that there are not context-independent standards of good reasoning that, when applied to 
increasingly comprehensive experiences, resolve scientific debates. In the early phases of the chemical revolution, 
phlogistonian could offer alternative analyses of the chemical reactions that Lavoisier viewed as showing the 
absorption or release of oxygen. As the number of findings increased, it became more and more difficult —and 
ultimately impossible— to find any consistent and unified way of treating all the reactions.” (Kitcher 1998, p. 40). 
 11 
framework of consensus practice will remain unaltered. I claim that there is a vast, unexplored middle ground 
between these extremes. (Kitcher 1993a, p. 164).  
 
In Kitcher’s view, only detailed historical studies could indicate to what extent social factors 
and the inputs from nature contribute to such decisions. From his rationalist position, half way 
between the two mentioned extremes, the closure of scientific debates is mainly the result of 
arguments and not of social factors; but he concedes that often this is a long and complex process 
and even the arguments might occasionally not have carried the greater weight in the decision (cf. 
Kitcher 1993a, pp. 162, 169 and 201-202).   
 
 
2. The Change to a Modest Realism: Science, Truth, and Democracy 
 
Science, Truth, and Democracy introduces substantial changes with regard to the realism presented 
in The Advancement of Science. According to Kitcher, the fundamental change was the acceptance 
of pluralism. The basic premise of pluralism sustains the idea that the world can be represented in 
very different ways for scientific purposes, without any of them ever being a complete 
representation. Besides, pluralism claims that, although all the representations which conform to 
nature are consistent, the representations accepted by scientists in any stage in the history may be 
inconsistent (cf. Kitcher 2002b, pp. 570-571). In other words, the pluralism defended by Kitcher in 
STD is the negation of metaphysical realism as it was defined by Hilary Putnam, and especially its 
commitment to a God’s Eye View. Or as Kitcher explains, it is the negation of the thesis that 
“[t]he world comes to us prepackaged into units, and a proper account of the truth and objectivity 
of the sciences must incorporate the idea that we aim for, and sometimes achieve, descriptions that 
correspond to natural divisions.” (Kitcher 2001a, p. 43).10 But Kitcher’s proposal differs from 
Putnam’s internal realism, since it does not give up the correspondence theory of truth. This union 
of the conceptual relativity defended by Putnam with the correspondence theory of truth 
approximates Kitcher’s modest realism to the critical scientific realism that the Finnish 
philosopher Ilkka Niiniluoto has been elaborating on for more than two decades (cf. Niiniluoto 
1984; 1999). 11 
                                                 
10
 In one of the more recent formulations, Putnam characterizes metaphysical realism as follows: “[T]here is a totality 
of Forms, or Universals, or “properties,” fixed once and for all, and […] every possible meaning of a word 
corresponds to one of these Forms or Universals or properties,” (Putnam 1999, p. 6).  
11
 In STD (p. 205) Kitcher explicitly says his realism is similar to those of Richard Miller and Jerrold Anderson; and in 
“Real Realism: The Galilean Strategy” (note 72) he claims that perhaps Putnam’s last works are close to his modest 
realism. As it is well known, Putnam has rejected his former conception of truth as warranted assertability in ideal 
epistemic conditions. 
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But this is not the only novelty Kitcher introduces in STD. In my opinion there are other 
important ones: (1) the insistence on the diversity and contextual dependence of the aims of 
scientific research, (2) the development of the notion of ‘significance’ as a contextual notion, (3) 
the greater weight given to the practical interests in science, (4) the admission that truth and 
knowledge are not absolute values, but are to be integrated with other non-epistemic values, and, 
finally, (5) the search for a “well-ordered” science, that is, a science compatible with democratic 
ideals. 
From this short enumeration of novel contributions, it can be easily inferred that, compared 
to the realism offered by Kitcher in The Advancement of Science, the modest realism of STD tries 
to incorporate the most reasonable contributions made from the antirealist point of view and from 
the social studies of science. In “A Plea for Science Studies” (Kitcher 1998, p. 36), Kitcher 
conceded that the antirealist side also had in its favor some theses well supported by all we know 
about scientific practice. Such theses form what he calls “the Socio-Historical Cluster,” as opposed 
to the previously quoted “Realist-Rationalist Cluster”: 
 
1. Science is done by human beings, that is, by cognitively limited beings who live in social groups with 
complicated structures and long histories. 
2. No scientist ever comes to the laboratory or the field without categories and preconceptions that have been 
shaped by the prior history of the group to which he or she belongs.  
3. The social structures present within science affect the ways in which research is transmitted and received, 
and this can have an impact on intratheoretical debates.  
4. The social structures in which science is embedded affect the kind of questions that are taken to be most 
significant and, sometimes, the answers that are proposed and accepted.  
 
Obviously, the most distant point from the realist position defended in AS is the end of thesis 
4. In fact, the rest is recognized, one way or another, in AS.12 A scientific realist has no difficulty 
in accepting that social structures affect the setting of a research agenda, that is to say, “the kind of 
questions that are taken to be most significant”; but it is a horse of a different color for the realist 
to concede that social structures affect “the answers that are proposed and accepted,” especially if 
it means that what answers are justified or valid will depend on the social structures. For a realist, 
social factors and non-epistemic values may affect the context of discovery and the context of 
                                                 
12
 Even though in The Advancement of Science (p. 6) Kitcher described his central aim as “to probe the notions of 
progress and rationality, dear to Legend’s champions” (balancing them with the contributions of some critics), later he 
seemingly prefers to describe it as an attempt to understand the form in which the social aspects operate: “[I]n The 
Advancement of Science, I try to show the intricacy of the reasoning processes that figure in major scientific debates 
and to construct a formal framework for understanding how various kinds of social institutions, social relationships, 
and personal aspirations can play a positive role in the genesis of new knowledge,” (Kitcher 1998, p. 45). 
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application, but they cannot affect the context of justification without undermining scientific 
objectivity (cf. Koertge 2000). 13  
However, Kitcher does not seem to be prepared to give to the external influences an 
important role in the context of justification. He writes: “the practical demands and the history of 
research standards also help determine what will count as acceptable solutions, specifying, for 
example, the precision that an answer must achieve if it is to be applicable.” (Kitcher 1998, p. 37). 
Social factors play, then, a very limited role in the acceptation of proposals by the scientific 
community: they can modify the rigor of acceptance criteria, so that a hypothesis which passes 
these criteria in a historical context will not pass them in another context, yet they cannot 
themselves dictate these criteria. As already pointed out, Kitcher made clear in AS that social 
factors do not determine the closure of scientific debates. On the contrary, debates are “ultimately 
closed through the articulation and acceptance of decisive arguments.” Arguments should be, then, 
“the principal source of power,” so that “in a competition between the social factors and 
arguments leading in a contrary direction, the acquisition of power should be more affected by the 
arguments. (Social factors may retard a decision, but never reverse it).” (Kitcher 1993a, pp. 201-
202).14 Nothing said in STD denies these claims. 
But let us begin at the beginning. Of course, Kitcher’s modest realism, as it is displayed in 
STD, agrees with the realism offered in AS on the postulation of a mind-independent reality which 
can suitably be known by human beings, as well as on the acceptation of the correspondence 
theory of truth. Kitcher coherently refuses the Kantian-constructivist thesis that the world is 
something we construct by means of our conceptual or linguistic frameworks. What we construct 
are our representations, not the world. We have direct access to a mind-independent reality able to 
be known; although Kitcher admits —without making clear the apparent conflict which arises— 
that the constructivist may be right when he claims this access is always mediated by our concepts. 
For that very reason, modest realism must deny the distinction between phenomenon and 
noumenon. It is not that we know the noumenon through the phenomenon, or that we know the 
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 A realist may admit that social factors affect not only the research agenda but also “the contents of the beliefs of 
scientists,” (Niiniluoto 1999, p. 268, note); but then it is a question of the content of the beliefs of individual scientists. 
A realist could also admit that the considered hypotheses are constrained by non-epistemic values that foster biases for 
or against some hypotheses. What cannot be carried out by such factors, according to the realists, is to determine what 
contents the scientific community accepts or considers justified.  
14
 For a criticism, see Shanahan (1997) and Solomon (1995). For the reasons mentioned, Solomon accuses Kitcher of 
being closer to “Legend” than he would like to admit. In her view, “scientists tend to be persuaded about a theory not 
when they have made a balanced consideration of all its merits and demerits, and judged it superior to all alternatives, 
but for more ‘sullied’ reasons such as the theory’s superior performance in their own area of research, their own 
collection of supportive data, peer pressure, bandwagon effects, graduate school training, etc.” (Solomon 1995, p. 
215). So, any philosopher who denies this wants to preserve the “Legend”. Anyway, Solomon interprets correctly 
Kitcher’s position when she sees that Kitcher’s open attitude to social factors does not go as far as to dilute the “merits 
and demerits” of theories in “more sullied reason,” whatever that may mean.  
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noumenon directly; we just directly know a reality with which we interact and whose properties 
we are sometimes able to detect successfully (cf. Kitcher 2001a, pp. 14-15, 16 note, and 25-28; 
2001b, pp. 183-184).  
However, the modest realism of STD is also in several aspects more sophisticated than the 
realism introduced in AS. It assumes, for instance, that the world can be conceptualized in very 
different ways; that the truths about it can be expressed in very diverse languages; and, therefore, 
that there is no privileged language or conceptual scheme able to give the only correct description 
of the world. Just like Putnam’s conceptual relativity, Kitcher’s modest realism holds that “there is 
thus no determinate answer to the question, ‘How many things are there?’ and no possibility of 
envisaging a complete inventory of nature.” (Kitcher 2001a, p. 45; cf. 2001b, p. 196). But, this 
does not mean that there are no mind-independent entities. There is a mind-independent reality, 
but it is not a labeled reality. It is not a reality categorized and structured in a fixed form, 
irrespective of our interests and concepts.15 Nevertheless, epistemological relativism, so popular 
among constructivists, is not justified either. Not every classification of the world is as valid as any 
other. Depending on our interests and aims, there will be more suitable languages and, then, more 
suitable classifications. None of them —and the relativist is right about that— could ever be 
considered the most suitable from an absolute point of view, i. e., in all the contexts and for any 
purpose. But, some classification could be considered the most suitable in some concrete context. 
In short, there is not a perfect language that will give us the authentic classification of true natural 
kinds, because any classification is always relative to some interests and aims; however, for some 
purposes it can be shown that certain classifications are better than others. This can be illustrated 
with the way in which present biology contemplates biological species. Sometimes they are 
distinguished according to morphological criteria (as in the case of plants with asexual 
reproduction), other times according to their reproductive isolation (as in the case of twin species), 
and still in other situations according to molecular criteria (as in the case of bacteria and viruses). 
The division into species depends, then, on scientists’ interests in each situation, but in each 
context a division is preferable to others (cf. Kitcher 2001a, pp. 45-49).16  
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 Niiniluoto holds the same: “THE WORLD [that is, the mind-independent world] does not contain self-identifying 
individuals, but can be categorized into objects in several alternative, overlapping ways relative to conceptual 
schemes. For example, depending on the choice of a suitable conceptual framework, THE WORLD can be ‘sliced’ or 
‘structured’ to a system of momentary events, mass points, physical systems, etc.” (Niiniluoto 1999, p. 222). 
16
 It is important to note that Kitcher’s pluralism about the species concept is not a conventionalist thesis, but a realist 
one. Conventionalists think that the diversity of species concepts is a good reason for denying the reality of such a 
category. What we call ‘species’ is a very different thing in every case, and its distinction from other taxa is 
problematic (cf. Stanford 1995; Ereshefsky 1998). On the contrary, Kitcher’s pluralism holds that there are different 
species concepts, all of them legitimate, but each concept only is properly applied to some groups of organisms, and 
for each group just one of these concepts is suitable. Species are real classes of individuals related by interesting 
biological relations. Now then, these relations are diverse and can be selected in different ways, so that there is not a 
single way of generating taxonomic classifications (cf. Kitcher 1984b).  
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Kitcher tries to dissipate the difficulties in understanding this intermediate position between 
metaphysical realism and relativistic constructivism with the help of a classical image in the recent 
literature about realism: the image of map-making. 
 
The history of map-making —he writes— illustrates the modest realism with which I began. Consider some of 
the maps of our planet offered by the geographers of the past, maps of the entire globe. Later maps appear 
superior to earlier ones in two major respects. First, they include entities that were previously omitted, the New 
World and Australasia being the most striking examples. Second, their depictions of the spatial relations among 
the entities commonly represented are more accurate; the margins of the various countries follow actual 
coastlines more closely. We make these judgements without believing that any of the maps ever produced is 
completely accurate, even while admitting the possibility that earlier maps might occasionally deliver a more 
accurate representation of some local features, and that the kind of convergence we appreciate visually need not 
be monotonic. (Kitcher 2001a, p. 55). 
 
Stephen Toulmin was one of the first authors who used the metaphor of scientific theories as 
maps, and curiously enough he did it to defend a kind of instrumentalism (cf. Toulmin 1953, chap. 
4). More recently, it has been used by Ronald Giere to defend a more modest realism than 
Kitcher’s version (although very similar to it in some aspects) (cf. Giere 1999).17  
Maps are always partial, selective, and possess conventional elements. They can offer only a 
perspective of reality based on our aims when we elaborate them. Depending on such aims, some 
entities or others will be chosen as objects to be represented, and some reading conventions or 
others will be accepted. A political map will pick out aspects of reality very unlike those presented 
in a rainfall map, a road map, an economic map, or a geological map, and it will represent these 
aspects by means of diverse conventional signs. All these maps might refer to the same region; 
however, the representation they offer will be dissimilar. In addition, it is senseless to postulate an 
exhaustively complete and correct map. Not even the Borgesian map of an empire, which when 
unfolded, had the same extension of the actual empire, would be complete, since it would need to 
be selective in some ways. In other words, there is not a single correct way of making a map. But, 
as opposed to what Giere maintains, Kitcher thinks that maps can be described as (approximately) 
true or false. A map of Spain in which Madrid is nearer to Valencia than to Toledo, or in which the 
Guadalquivir River flows into the Bay of Biscay, would be not only an inaccurate map. It could be 
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 For instance, Giere does not accept that scientific theories are (approximately) true in the sense of the 
correspondence theory of truth. Giere also thinks the way in which maps represent reality may be used as an analogy 
to clarify the way in which theories and models in science represent it. However, in contrast to Kitcher, Giere does not 
see maps as true or false, but just as more or less accurate, more or less detailed, etc. Also, in contrast to Kitcher, Giere 
proposes, at least as a methodological rule, that we proceed in science as if the world has a single structure, which 
means that “the existence of conflicting applications of different types of models is an indication that one or both types 
of models fail to fit the world as well as they might” (Giere 1999, p. 83). 
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said to be a false map. Following the analogy, scientific theories are also partial and tied to 
conventional elements of representation which might change depending on the interests; 
nevertheless, even in that case, it would make sense to talk about the true or falsity of its assertions 
about the world: 
 
Like maps, scientific theories and hypotheses must be true or accurate (or, at least, approximately true or 
roughly accurate) to be good. But there is more to goodness in both instances. Beyond the necessary condition 
is a requirement of significance that cannot be understood in terms of some projected ideal —completed 
science, a Theory of Everything, or an ideal atlas. (Kitcher 2001a, p. 61). 
 
This quotation brings up an additional point that has great relevance in STD, although it was 
present in AS in an incipient way. Science does not aim to achieve the truth without more ado, but 
to achieve significant truths; just like maps do not represent for the sake of accuracy, but in order 
to be useful for some practical purposes. In science, however, significance is not a basically 
practical matter, as in the maps, but an epistemic one. What is important for science is to achieve 
epistemically significant truths. Now then, all the attempts carried out within the philosophical 
tradition to find a characterization of significance valid for all times and contexts have failed. The 
reason is that one cannot separate epistemic significance and the concrete practical concerns that 
guide the scientific community in given historical situations. The best proposal that can be found 
in the matter is, in Kitcher’s view, the one that identifies epistemic significance with the capacity 
to offer objective explanations about nature: a significant truth would be a truth able to provide an 
objective explanation or an objective understanding of phenomena. Actually several aspects of 
explanations depend on the context, not only because the context says what things are to be 
explained, but also because it determines which explanations are satisfactory according to the 
audience. There is nothing like a ‘significant-in-all-contexts-explanation’.  
The contextual character of significance has important consequences in practice. There are 
no ideal atlases, ideal classifications of the world, or context-independent objective explanations. 
This implies, as we are told in the epilogue of STD, that “Nature is shaped by our past interests, its 
current configurations partially determine our present needs, and out of these needs grow our 
further attempts to solve problems we take to be epistemically and practically significant” (p. 199). 
The following step in Kitcher’s argumentation (to which the second part of the book is 
dedicated) seems then quite logical: if science looks for significant truths and the significance is 
not something that some truths possess intrinsically, but depends on the context, then we are 
entitled to establish what truths we want science to look for at each moment, i. e., what truths we 
consider more significant for our interests. The usual answer to this question has, hitherto, been 
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that the scientists themselves have to determine such matter. Kitcher thinks that in democratic 
societies this subject should not be exclusively in their hands, but neither should it be in the hands 
of outsiders, such as businessmen. A pure, value-free science does not exist; on the contrary, 
considerations about values —including non-epistemic values (moral, political, social… values)— 
are consubstantial to scientific practice. Moreover, truth and knowledge are not intrinsically good 
or beneficial things. If we take this for granted, it is hardly surprising that science is not currently 
well-ordered, and that it is abundant in conflicts that arise between scientific practice and the 
ideals of a democratic society. In a well-ordered science —to which we must aspire— the aims 
would be set by the interests of democratic society. Science should set significant truths, but the 
significance should be determined by the citizens’ interests, ideally decided through the 
deliberation procedures of an illustrated democracy (people representative of diverse perspectives 
tutored by scientific experts). These interests should then set the scientific research agenda. 
We will not consider here in more details Kitcher’s proposal to get a well-ordered science 
(some critical reflections can be found in Brown (2004), Jasanoff (2004), and Mirowski (2004)). 
This is obviously a very difficult issue. Some authors have even questioned the desirability of its 
accomplishment. (Does a well-ordered science not run the risk of being a politicized science in the 
worst sense of the word? Is it not worryingly close to Bruno Latour’s thesis that science is politics 
done by other means?). Nonetheless, in my opinion, this is an inescapable issue in view of the real 
situation of science in advanced societies and its increasingly complex relationship with the public. 
Kitcher has merit for having remarked on its importance for the philosophy of science and not only 
for the sociology of science (not to forget, however, antecedents such as John Dewey and Paul 
Feyerabend, to mention only the best known). In the following pages I would rather concentrate on 
some ontological aspects of modest realism that Kitcher draws in STD which I find particularly 
problematic.  
 
 
3. The Hardship of Modesty 
 
Kitcher’s modest realism is a sophisticated position which avoids many objections raised in the 
past decades to strong realism or to metaphysical realism in Putnam’s sense. Nevertheless, modest 
realism has some troubles from the concessions it makes to antirealism. I will expose one which I 
consider particularly important.  
As explained above, Kitcher tries to harmonize the correspondence theory of truth with the 
conceptual relativity defended for a good while by Putnam. It is debatable, however, whether both 
things are easily compatible. If our knowledge of the world is mediated by our categories and 
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concepts, if the choice of these categories and concepts varies in accordance with our interests —
and it does not depend on the existence of natural kinds or an intrinsic structure of the world—, 
then it becomes problematic to establish what our true sentences correspond to. Do they 
correspond to a mind-independent world (a world devoid of an intrinsic ontological structure, in 
the event that we strictly assume conceptual relativity), or to a world structured by our categories 
and concepts? 
The first alternative makes no sense, as Putnam indicated. There cannot be a correspondence 
between our sentences and a wholly unstructured reality.18 So, we have to choose the second 
option. When we say that a statement is true, that means that there is a correspondence between 
this statement and the world as it is offered to us shaped by our languages or conceptual schemes. 
But, if we interpret Kitcher in this way, his modest realism has to face then the same problem as 
Kantian transcendental idealism in order to define the concept of truth. For transcendental 
idealism, our true statements cannot correspond to a noumenal world, but to a phenomenal one, 
and, therefore, to a world constructed by us. In spite of the lack of agreement by authors who have 
considered the issue, there does not appear to be a special impediment to understand the 
correspondence theory of truth in a non-realist form. This theory claims that a sentence is true if 
and only if what the sentence affirms corresponds to reality, but the theory leaves open how to 
conceive the reality. It might be understood as a mind-independent reality or as a reality 
constructed, or at least structured, by our mind. Not only Kant, but also by the early 20th century 
British philosopher J. M. E. McTaggart understood it in this last way. However, this alternative 
meet an objection. May we talk in such a case about ‘correspondence’? Would not it rather be a 
matter of mere coherence between different representations of the world: the coherence between 
the part of a world-version offered by a statement and the world-version constructed in some 
concrete act of experience? So it would be —in my opinion— if the world had no capacity for 
constriction about the versions or structures that we might build in our mind. A correspondence 
between our ideas and wholly mind-dependent facts would not be but a mere coherence between 
ideas. The key is, then, whether the mind-independent world has something to say or not.19 
Certainly Kitcher —just like Kant, but more coherently20— resorts to a causal (and pre-
conceptual) relation with the world, and, since this causal relation enables us to accede to the 
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 Nevertheless, for a suggestive exploration of this possibility, see Horgan and Potrč (2000). 
19
 Not to perceive clearly that is, in my opinion, the main deficiency in Michael P. Lynch’s attempt to make the 
conceptual relativity compatible with the correspondence theory of truth. Lynch does not provide any explanation 
about how it is possible that the correspondence with the world makes our statements true if, on the other hand, there 
is no mind-independent fact (cf. Lynch 1998).  
20
 As it was remarked by his early critics, Kant cannot coherently resort to a causal relation between the noumenal 
world and our cognitive faculties, since, according to his philosophy, the category of causality can only be applied to 
the phenomena, i.e., to the empirical realm. The complex problems presented by the notion of truth within Kantian 
philosophy can be profitably read in Palacios (1979). See also Putnam (1981), pp. 60-64. 
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world, he refuses the distinction phenomenon/noumenon. But, I am inclined to think that this 
viewpoint does not solve the difficulty. We could say that true statements correspond to a 
conceptually structured reality, with this reality being the result of applying our concepts and 
categories to an independent and unstructured world causally related to us. So, our true statements 
would be causally selected by the world itself. This causal interaction, however, would not be 
enough to establish a correspondence between our statements and an unstructured “something,” 
among other reasons, because that correspondence is not a causal relation (we can talk about a 
correspondence between a sentence and some future fact, which obviously is not causally related 
to us). 
Niiniluoto discusses in some detail this question that also arises in his proposal of a critical 
scientific realism (cf. Niiniluoto 1999, pp. 224-226).21 In order to solve it, he distinguishes 
between unidentified facts and identified facts. Unidentified facts are the facts contained in the 
mind-independent world, whereas identified facts are the facts belonging to a structured world-
version. According to Niiniluoto, if a sentence is true in a world-version —if it is true about some 
identified facts—, then it is true in the mind-independent world as well —it is true about some 
unidentified facts. The reason is that every world-version is only determined by a chosen language 
and the mind-independent world, and after all “THE [mind-independent] WORLD does not 
change in any way when we give descriptions of it.” (Niiniluoto 1999, p. 219). The identified facts 
belong to the same world as the unidentified ones. They are not an intermediate between us and 
the world. They are just the unidentified facts as described relative to some language.22  
Nevertheless, I think this recourse is really an implicit admission that the world has an 
intrinsic structure, although it is one in which facts —events or “states of affair” that might happen 
according to such structure— are not yet identified through human categories or concepts, and 
when identified, it may occur in several alternative forms. If not, why are not all descriptions 
possible? In fact, Niiniluoto admits that the world has a very basic intrinsic spatio-temporal 
structure and obeys natural causal laws. This structure does not come from our languages and 
conceptual schemes.23 
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 He is completely convinced that the problem can be solved: “Semantical realism is compatible with ontological 
pluralism: the non-epistemic correspondence theory of truth can be combined with the idea that objects can be 
individuated and identified in alternative ways through different conceptual systems,” (Niiniluoto 1999, p. 205). 
22
 Niiniluoto also distinguishes between unidentified objects and identified objects (literarilly unindentified flying 
objects (UFOs) and identified flying objects (IFOs)). Since UFOs form a part of THE WORLD, Niiniluoto finally 
admits that in some sense of the term ‘object’ (i. e., not self-identifying objects, “slices” of THE WORLD potentially 
identifiable in several ways) there are objects independent of our conceptual schemes (cf. Niiniluoto 1999, pp. 224-
226).  
23
 Cf. Ibidem. Niiniluoto also postulates a basic ontology consisting of mind-independent “property-individuals” 
located in space and time, such as the-brownness-of-this-table. These individualized qualities have been called 
‘tropes’. The property of being brown would be the class of similar tropes, and, as a class, is a human construction. 
The objects would be the mereological sum of jointly occurring tropes, which can be selected in different forms (cf. 
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Neither for Kitcher nor for Niiniluoto is the mind-independent world completely malleable 
by means of our conceptual frameworks. We cannot impose on the world any arbitrary structure 
and hope that this imposition will always work in practice. Niiniluoto calls ‘factuality’ the 
resistance the world offers to the attempts to fit it into any conceptual scheme. But, if the idea that 
the world has a previous structure is rejected, it remains to be seen whether it can be satisfactorily 
explained why the world accepts some classifications and resists others. Maps are more or less 
accurate, more or less true. A map of the London Underground would not be of use for guiding us 
through the Paris Underground. In fact, all possible maps of the London Underground have to 
keep some structural similitude if they are to be effective: not every structure of lines and stations, 
of crossing and changes, will be valid. Kitcher claims: “Users of different schemes of 
representation may find it difficult to coordinate their languages. Properly understood, however, 
the truths they enunciate are completely consistent.” (Kitcher 2001a, p. 47). Accepting that such is 
the case, what could guarantee this consistency except the fact that these languages refer to the 
same reality, a reality with an intrinsic structure that does not depends on them? 
It is interesting to know that, according to some psychological experiments, a visual stimulus 
wholly devoid of structure cannot be perceived. The existence of structured stimuli is needed in 
order to have a visual perception. This order must come from a somewhat structured reality, not 
from our mind; otherwise the experimental results could not be explained. So, an unstructured and 
homogenous noumenal dough would be simply imperceptible. This is not incompatible with the 
well-known fact that our perception, being selective itself, processes inputs which sensorial stimuli 
provide. The point is just that the structure of the world responsible for structuring the sensorial 
stimuli is not necessarily the structure we finally attribute to the world. Our mind has an active 
role, a constructive role if we prefer the expression. It elaborates the brute material received 
through the senses in more or less complex forms. But this construction is not built on the 
noumenon, but on a world with some ontological structure of its own (cf. Boulter 2004).  
I think some light can be thrown upon this issue if we distinguish three forms of 
understanding ontological realism, that is to say, three alternative ways of specifying how a mind-
independent world is to be conceived. I will call them ‘Platonic-Aristotelian Ontological Realism’ 
(PAOR), ‘Moderate Ontological Realism’ (MOR), and ‘Kantian Ontological Realism’ (KOR). 
This is, respectively, what they affirm: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
Niiniluoto 1999, p. 30). It is not clear to me how to conceive the ‘tropes’ except as a certain type of intrinsic structure 
of the world. The sort of ontological realism defended by Niiniluoto and its differences from Putnam’s (and Quine’s) 
position can be seen in the lucid and detailed discussion in Pihlström (1996), cap. 4. 
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(PAOR): The world has an ontologically complete and categorically fixed structure (it is a 
‘ready-made’ and labeled world consisting of self-identifying objects). This structure dictates 
exactly one true and complete description of the world. 
(MOR): The world has a basic intrinsic structure compatible with several (and, perhaps, 
potentially infinite) impositions and classifications made by our conceptual schemes or linguistic 
frameworks. So, it tolerates many different versions, but all of them within limits defined by this 
structure. It is an unfinished structure and also inexhaustible from the point of view of human 
interests and capacities. It is not categorically ready-made and it does not dictate just one correct 
description. 
(KOR): The world possesses no intrinsic structure. Any structure in any world-
representation comes from our conceptual schemes, categories or languages. 
 
(PAOR) is ingenuous, and hard to maintain given the pragmatists’ criticisms (especially 
Quine’s and Putnam’s criticisms), let alone the results of cognitive sciences showing the active 
role of mind —an embodied and largely social mind— in the knowledge process, and the creative 
character of our conceptualizing abilities (cf. Lakoff 1987; Martínez-Freire 1998). (KOR) has been 
Putnam’s position for some years and it appears it is sometimes defended by Kitcher. But, as I 
have argued, it is too weak to sustain a realism committed to correspondence theory of truth; and 
in this sense, Putnam is coherent when he gives up such theory in favor of a pragmatist conception 
of truth. (KOR) is not able satisfactorily to explain why the world is not completely malleable; 
why it resists some of the things we might want to make with it by means of our languages and 
conceptual schemes. Finally, from an evolutionary point of view (KOR) is less plausible than its 
alternatives: if every world-structure comes only from our mind, it would be difficult to explain 
the adaptive value of our cognitive capabilities, since the world would have no role in the success 
of these abilities in managing the environment. Consequently, I hold that Kitcher’s modest 
realism, like any other realism that refuses (PAOR), should accept (MOR). 
(MOR) is not affected by many criticisms made against the dogmatism and the 
foundationalism of (PAOR), but it is still strong enough to explain why certain divisions and 
classifications fit into the world. We can offer only some world-versions, knowing that we cannot 
exhaust with them all the aspects of the world or to find the “Right Version.” But, given the basic 
ontological structure of the world, not all versions are possible or equally suitable. There are 
versions that fit easily into such structure, whereas other versions need to be forced to fit into it, 
and finally other versions velis nolis do not fit at all. In the words of Umberto Eco, it happens to 
the world just “like to the ox or the calf: in different civilizations they are carved up in different 
forms, so that the name of some dishes is not easily translatable from a language into other. 
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However, it would be very difficult to conceive a carving-up that offers together the extremity of 
snout and the tail.” (Eco 1997, p. 63). The ox and the calf do not dictate what carving-up must be 
done; their ontological nature is “pre-butcherish,” so to speak, and it tolerates different 
possibilities. Nevertheless, both have a structure that determines that no carving-up can include the 
snout and the tail in the same piece.24 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Kitcher’s modest realism, as displayed in Science, Truth and Democracy, is an attempt to 
integrate, from a moderate realist point of view, concerns about the democratic control of science. 
In preceding decades, these concerns were often linked to antirealist and even openly relativistic 
positions. Kitcher holds the need for a well-ordered science, to wit, a science whose aims are set 
by the interests of democratic societies established by means of informed (scientifically tutored) 
processes of deliberation. Nevertheless, in line with his realism, Kitcher does not admit that social 
interests can affect the epistemic validity of scientific results. On this point, his approach is 
opposed to that of social constructivism. Democratic deliberation affects the research agenda —the 
sort of problems considered significant—, the resources to be assigned, the strategies seen as more 
appropriate, and the transfer of results to concrete applications. Not surprisingly, some supporters 
of social constructivism have considered —wrongly in my opinion— Kitcher’s proposal as a 
modality of what himself called “The Legend” in the philosophy of science. 
However, from an ontological and semantic point of view, Kitcher’s modest realism has 
some internal difficulties. It is not clear whether Kitcher accepts a moderate ontological realism, 
for which the world has a basic intrinsic structure compatible with several conceptual or linguistic 
impositions or divisions, or he accepts, instead, a Kantian ontological realism, for which the world 
lacks an intrinsic structure and any structure comes from our conceptual schemes, categories or 
languages. We have argued that it is possible to sustain a correspondence theory of truth —which 
                                                 
24
 An author that, in my view, holds a position close to (MOR) is Alvin Goldman. That is quite manifest in the 
following quotation: “There are indefinitely many sorts of apparel that might be designed for the human body, just as 
there are indefinitely many categories, principles of classification, and propositional forms that might be used to 
describe the world. Although the body certainly has parts, it is not presorted into units that must each be covered by a 
distinct garment. It is up to human custom and sartorial inventiveness to decide not only what parts to cover, but what 
types of garments should cover which expanses of the body, and whether those garments should be snug or loose,” 
(Goldman 1986, p. 152). I also consider close to (MOR) the realistic contextualism exposed by Nicholas Rescher in 
Nature and Understanding (2000).  
On the other hand, Niiniluoto’s distinction between UFOs and IFOs (see note above) implicitly situates him close 
to (MOR), since this distinction seems to imply that there are structures dependent on our conceptual schemes or 
languages (L-structures), but there is also certain ontic order. At that rate, the world would not be ready-made, that is, 
it does not impose on us a predetermined conceptual or linguistic order, but even so the UFOs have some own order. If 
things are understood in this way, Putnam´s claim that the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world 
could acquire a more precise sense. 
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is the theory of truth embraced by Kitcher— from the first kind of ontological realism, but not 
from the second. Therefore, modest realism makes sense only if it includes moderate ontological 
realism.25 
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